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(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

**H. R.** \_\_\_\_\_

To support the diplomatic, economic, and physical space of Taiwan, and  
for other purposes.

\_\_\_\_\_  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. BERA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee  
on \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
**A BILL**

To support the diplomatic, economic, and physical space of  
Taiwan, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the  
5 “Taiwan Peace and Stability Act”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for  
7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings and statement of policy.

TITLE I—SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION  
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

- Sec. 101. Findings.  
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress on Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community.  
Sec. 103. Strategy to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.  
Sec. 104. Expanding United States-Taiwan development cooperation.  
Sec. 105. Appropriate congressional committees.

## TITLE II—ADVANCING TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC SPACE

- Sec. 201. Sense of Congress on expanding U.S. economic relations with Taiwan.  
Sec. 202. Legal framework for expanding economic relations with Taiwan.  
Sec. 203. Appropriate congressional committees.

## TITLE III—ENHANCING DETERRENCE OVER TAIWAN

- Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on peace and stability in the Taiwan strait.  
Sec. 302. Strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-strait conflict.  
Sec. 303. Supporting Taiwan’s investment in asymmetric capabilities.  
Sec. 304. Advancing Taiwan’s territorial defense force concept.  
Sec. 305. Strengthening Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals.  
Sec. 306. Appropriate congressional committees.

**1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

2 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
3 ings:

4 (1) The United States has consistently sought  
5 to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a cen-  
6 tral element of United States foreign policy toward  
7 the region.

8 (2) Peace and stability in East Asia has pro-  
9 vided the necessary environment for the tremendous  
10 economic growth experienced by the region and re-  
11 mains critical to the continued development and  
12 prosperity of all people in the Indo-Pacific.

13 (3) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public  
14 Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq) and the “Six As-

1       surances”, provided by the United States to Taiwan  
2       in July 1982, are the cornerstones of United States-  
3       Taiwan relations and continue to guide United  
4       States policy toward Taiwan.

5               (4) The Taiwan Relations Act states that it is  
6       the policy of the United States to:

7               “(1) preserve and promote extensive, close, and  
8       friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations be-  
9       tween the people of the United States and the people  
10       on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China main-  
11       land and all other peoples of the Western Pacific  
12       area;

13              “(2) declare that peace and stability in the area  
14       are in the political, security, and economic interests  
15       of the United States, and are matters of inter-  
16       national concern;

17              “(3) make clear that the United States decision  
18       to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s  
19       Republic of China rests upon the expectation that  
20       the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful  
21       means;

22              “(4) consider any effort to determine the future  
23       of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including  
24       by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and

1 security of the Western Pacific area and of grave  
2 concern to the United States;

3 “(5) provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive  
4 character; and

5 “(6) maintain the capacity of the United States  
6 to resist any resort to force or other forms of coer-  
7 cion that would jeopardize the security, or the social  
8 or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”.

9 (5) The Government of the People’s Republic of  
10 China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai  
11 Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam-  
12 paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi-  
13 cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to  
14 erode United States policy and create a fait accompli  
15 on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future.

16 (6) In order to ensure the longevity of United  
17 States policy and preserve the ability of the people  
18 of Taiwan to determine their future independently,  
19 it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, eco-  
20 nomic, and physical space.

21 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
22 United States to—

23 (1) maintain the position that peace and sta-  
24 bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, se-

1       curity, and economic interests of the United States,  
2       and are matters of international concern; and

3               (2) work with allies and partners to promote  
4       peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter  
5       military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that  
6       would undermine regional stability.

7       **TITLE I—SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S**  
8       **MEANINGFUL            PARTICIPA-**  
9       **TION IN THE INTERNATIONAL**  
10      **COMMUNITY**

11      **SEC. 101. FINDINGS.**

12      Congress makes the following findings:

13               (1) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani-  
14      tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases  
15      such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever  
16      in countries around the world. During the COVID-  
17      19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of  
18      personal protective equipment and COVID-19 tests  
19      to countries in need.

20               (2) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and  
21      Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina  
22      Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and  
23      Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Tai-  
24      wan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

1           (3) Taiwan was invited to participate in the  
2           World Health Assembly, the decisionmaking body of  
3           the World Health Organization (WHO), as an ob-  
4           server annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the  
5           2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has in-  
6           creasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the  
7           WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA  
8           in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.

9           (4) The Taipei Flight Information Region re-  
10          portedly served 1.75 million flights and 68.9 million  
11          passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan  
12          International airport, the eleventh busiest airport in  
13          the world. Taiwan has been excluded from partici-  
14          pating at the International Civil Aviation Organiza-  
15          tion (ICAO) since 2013.

16          (5) United Nations (UN) General Assembly  
17          Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of rep-  
18          resentation of Taiwan and its people at the United  
19          Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to rep-  
20          resent the people of Taiwan.

21 **SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL**  
22 **PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL**  
23 **COMMUNITY.**

24          It is the sense of Congress that—

1           (1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous,  
2           and is home to 23.5 million people. It is an impor-  
3           tant contributor to the global community, as a model  
4           for democracy, and by providing expertise in global  
5           health, international aviation security, emerging  
6           technology development, and with forward looking  
7           environmental policies;

8           (2) multiple United States Government Admin-  
9           istrations of both political parties have taken impor-  
10          tant steps to advance Taiwan's meaningful partici-  
11          pation in international organizations;

12          (3) existing efforts to enhance United States  
13          cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public  
14          goods, including through development assistance, hu-  
15          manitarian assistance, and disaster relief in tri-  
16          lateral and multilateral fora is laudable and should  
17          continue;

18          (4) nonetheless, significant structural, policy,  
19          and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan's  
20          meaningful participation in the international com-  
21          munity; and

22          (5) efforts to share Taiwan's expertise with  
23          other parts of the global community could be further  
24          enhanced through a systematic approach, along with

1 greater attention from Congress and the American  
2 public to such efforts.

3 **SEC. 103. STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL**  
4 **PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-**  
5 **ZATIONS.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
7 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in  
8 consultation with other Federal departments and agencies  
9 as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
10 sional committees a strategy—

11 (1) to advance Taiwan's meaningful participa-  
12 tion in a prioritized set of international organiza-  
13 tions (IOs); and

14 (2) that responds to growing pressure from the  
15 PRC on foreign governments, IOs, commercial ac-  
16 tors, and civil society organizations to comply with  
17 its “One-China Principle”, with respect to Taiwan.

18 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—The strategy required in  
20 subsection (a) shall include—

21 (A) An assessment of the methods the  
22 PRC uses to coerce actors to into adhering to  
23 its “One-China Principle”. The methods shall  
24 include those employed against governments,  
25 IOs, and civil society organizations. The assess-

1           ment shall also include pressure on commercial  
2           actors, to the extent it is relevant in the context  
3           of Taiwan's meaningful participation in IOs.

4           (B) An assessment of the policies of for-  
5           eign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan,  
6           to identify likeminded allies and partners who  
7           might become public or private partners in the  
8           strategy.

9           (C) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as  
10          practicable, to identify IOs that best lend them-  
11          selves to advancing Taiwan's participation. The  
12          analysis shall include, but is not limited to the  
13          IOs'—

14                 (i) policy on the requirements to ob-  
15                 tain membership and observer status, as  
16                 well as the foundational documents defin-  
17                 ing membership requirements and observer  
18                 status within the IO;

19                 (ii) participation rules;

20                 (iii) processes for developing member-  
21                 ship requirements and participation rules;

22                 (iv) policies of current members re-  
23                 garding Taiwan's political status; and

1 (v) relative reliance on contributions  
2 from the PRC and how it may affect inter-  
3 nal decisionmaking.

4 (D) An evaluation of the feasibility and ad-  
5 visability of expanding economic, security, and  
6 diplomatic engagement with nations that have  
7 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-  
8 graded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns  
9 with United States interests.

10 (E) A survey of IOs that have allowed Tai-  
11 wan's meaningful participation, including an as-  
12 sessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan's  
13 engagement has occurred within those organiza-  
14 tions and how Taiwan's participation has posi-  
15 tively strengthened the capacity and activity of  
16 these organizations, thereby providing positive  
17 models for Taiwan's inclusion in other similar  
18 forums.

19 (F) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which  
20 the United States Government will prioritize for  
21 using its voice, vote, and influence to advance  
22 Taiwan's meaningful participation over the  
23 three-year period following the date of enact-  
24 ment of this Act. The list shall be derived from  
25 the IOs identified in subparagraph (C).

1 (G) A description of the diplomatic strate-  
2 gies and the coalitions the United States Gov-  
3 ernment plans to develop to implement subpara-  
4 graph (F).

5 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in  
6 subsection (a) shall be classified, but it may include an  
7 unclassified summary, if the Secretary of State determines  
8 it appropriate.

9 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

10 (1) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term  
11 “international organization” shall include, but is not  
12 limited to, UN funds, programs, specialized agen-  
13 cies, entities, and bodies. It shall also include other  
14 organizations outside of the UN system, as the Sec-  
15 retary of State or his or her designee deems appro-  
16 priate, and in consultation with other Federal de-  
17 partments and agencies.

18 (2) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term “One-  
19 China Principle” shall solely and exclusively refer to  
20 the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan.

21 (3) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term  
22 “civil society organizations” means international  
23 civil society organizations that are critical to main-  
24 taining Taiwan’s international space and enabling

1 Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in  
2 the global community.

3 (e) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State or his  
4 or her designee, shall consult with the appropriate con-  
5 gressional committees—

6 (1) not later than 90 days after the date of en-  
7 actment of this Act, on the list of IOs identified in  
8 subsection (b)(1)(C); and

9 (2) 180 days after submitting the strategy re-  
10 quired in subsection (a), and 180 days thereafter for  
11 2 years, regarding the development and implementa-  
12 tion of the strategy.

13 **SEC. 104. EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOP-**  
14 **MENT COOPERATION.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the  
16 date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the  
17 United States Agency for International Development  
18 (USAID), in consultation with the United States Inter-  
19 national Development Finance Corporation (DFC), shall  
20 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-  
21 port on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral and multi-  
22 lateral development initiatives.

23 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-  
24 quired in subsection (a) shall include—

1           (1) A comprehensive review of existing coopera-  
2           tion mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or  
3           DFC, and relevant departments and agencies in Tai-  
4           wan, including, but not limited to Taiwan's Inter-  
5           national Cooperation and Development Fund  
6           (ICDF).

7           (2) An assessment of how USAID and DFC de-  
8           velopment cooperation with relevant departments  
9           and agencies in Taiwan compares to comparable co-  
10          operation with partners of similar economic size and  
11          foreign assistance capacity.

12          (3) An analysis of the opportunities and chal-  
13          lenges the cooperation reviewed in paragraph (1) has  
14          offered to date. The analysis shall include, but is not  
15          limited to—

16                (A) opportunities collaboration has offered  
17                to expand USAID's and DFC's ability to de-  
18                liver assistance into a wider range communities;

19                (B) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF,  
20                other relevant agencies and departments in Tai-  
21                wan, or the organizations' implementing part-  
22                ners have a comparative advantage in providing  
23                assistance; and

24                (C) opportunities to transition virtual ca-  
25                pacity building events with relevant depart-

1           ments and agencies in Taiwan, through the  
2           Global Cooperation and Training Framework  
3           (GCTF) as well as other forums, into in-person,  
4           enduring forms of development cooperation.

5           (4) An assessment of any legal, policy,  
6           logistical, financial, or administrative barriers to ex-  
7           panding cooperation in trilateral or multilateral de-  
8           velopment. The analysis shall include, but is not lim-  
9           ited to—

10                   (A) availability of personnel at the Amer-  
11                   ican Institute in Taiwan (AIT) responsible for  
12                   coordinating development assistance coopera-  
13                   tion;

14                   (B) volume of current cooperation initia-  
15                   tives and barriers to expanding it;

16                   (C) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers fac-  
17                   ing the United States or other partners to in-  
18                   cluding Taiwan in formal and informal multilat-  
19                   eral development cooperation mechanisms;

20                   (D) resource or capacity barriers to ex-  
21                   panding cooperation facing the United States or  
22                   Taiwan; and

23                   (E) Geopolitical barriers that complicate  
24                   United States-Taiwan cooperation in third  
25                   countries.

1 (5) Recommendations to address the challenges  
2 identified in paragraph (4).

3 (6) A description of any additional resources or  
4 authorities that expanding cooperation might re-  
5 quire.

6 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in  
7 subsection (a) shall be unclassified, but it may include a  
8 classified annex if the Administrator of USAID deter-  
9 mines it appropriate.

10 **SEC. 105. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

11 In this title, the term “appropriate congressional  
12 committees” means—

13 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
14 House of Representatives; and

15 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
16 Senate.

17 **TITLE II—ADVANCING TAIWAN’S**  
18 **ECONOMIC SPACE**

19 **SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING U.S. ECO-**  
20 **NOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.**

21 It is the sense of the Congress that:

22 (1) Expanding United States economic relations  
23 with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the  
24 United States and Taiwan. Taiwan is now the  
25 United States’ 10th largest goods trading partner,

1 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of  
2 imports, and a key destination for United States ag-  
3 ricultural exports.

4 (2) Further integration, consistent with robust  
5 environmental standard and labor rights, would ben-  
6 efit both peoples and is in the strategic and diplo-  
7 matic interests of the United States.

8 (3) The United States should explore opportu-  
9 nities to expand economic agreements between Tai-  
10 wan and the United States, through dialogue, and  
11 by developing the legal templates required to support  
12 potential future agreements.

13 **SEC. 202. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPANDING ECONOMIC**  
14 **RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
16 date of enactment of this Act, the United States Trade  
17 Representative, in consultation with other Federal depart-  
18 ments and agencies as appropriate, shall present to the  
19 appropriate congressional committees a legal template for  
20 establishing trade and investment agreements with Tai-  
21 wan that is consistent with the nature of the United  
22 States' relations with Taiwan. Such template shall be de-  
23 signed to be applicable to a trade agreement, as well as  
24 other forms of trade and investment agreements.

1 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in sub-  
2 section (a) shall be unclassified, but it may include a clas-  
3 sified annex, if appropriate.

4 **SEC. 203. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

5 In this title, the term “appropriate congressional  
6 committees” means—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the  
8 Committee on Ways and Means of the House of  
9 Representatives, and

10 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, and  
11 the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

12 **TITLE III—ENHANCING**  
13 **DETERRENCE OVER TAIWAN**

14 **SEC. 301. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY**  
15 **IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.**

16 It is the sense of Congress that—

17 (1) the United States should continue to pursue  
18 a policy of promoting peace in the Indo-Pacific for  
19 the benefit of the peoples of Asia and of the United  
20 States;

21 (2) maintaining peace and stability in the Tai-  
22 wan Strait is in the national security interest of the  
23 United States;

24 (3) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, includ-  
25 ing through high rates of PRC sorties into air space

1 near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises  
2 near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United  
3 States position that differences in cross-Strait rela-  
4 tions must be resolved peacefully;

5 (4) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict  
6 to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any in-  
7 crease in the risk of conflict demands attention and  
8 obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most  
9 viable means to prevent war;

10 (5) the United States should work with allies  
11 and partners to expand the community of partners  
12 involved in building a credible deterrent toward a  
13 cross-Strait conflict;

14 (6) Taiwan should continue to invest in and im-  
15 plement its asymmetric defense strategy, including  
16 but not limited to coastal defense cruise missiles,  
17 while also strengthening recruitment and training of  
18 its reserve force; and

19 (7) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essen-  
20 tial to maintain open and effective crisis communica-  
21 tion and risk reduction mechanisms as a means to  
22 reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately,  
23 conflict.

1 **SEC. 302. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A**  
2 **CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
4 date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit  
5 to the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-  
6 government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-  
7 Strait military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.

8 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy shall  
9 include the following:

10 (1) A comprehensive review of existing diplo-  
11 matic, economic, and military tools to establish de-  
12 terrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an assess-  
13 ment of their efficacy.

14 (2) An examination of the present and future  
15 capabilities of the United States and Taiwan to re-  
16 spond to the potential PLA campaigns against Tai-  
17 wan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The analysis shall in-  
18 clude an assessment of the progress Taiwan has  
19 made in developing the asymmetric capabilities need-  
20 ed to respond to its strategic environment, as well as  
21 the additional capabilities and reforms required.

22 (3) An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding  
23 coordination with United States allies and partners  
24 to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict.  
25 The review shall include, but is not limited to, a re-  
26 view of the following matters—

1 (A) Expanding coordination of public or  
2 private messaging on deterrence vis-à-vis Tai-  
3 wan;

4 (B) Coordinating use of economic tools to  
5 raise the costs of PRC military action that  
6 could precipitate a cross-Strait conflict;

7 (C) Enhancing co-development and co-de-  
8 ployment of military capabilities related to de-  
9 terrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or enhanc-  
10 ing coordinated training of Taiwan's military  
11 forces;

12 (4) Recommendations on significant additional  
13 diplomatic, economic, and military steps available to  
14 the United States Government, unilaterally and in  
15 concert with United States allies and partners, to  
16 enhance the clarity and credibility of deterrence over  
17 a cross-Strait conflict.

18 (5) A description of any additional resources or  
19 authorities needed to implement the recommenda-  
20 tions identified in paragraph (4).

21 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in  
22 subsection (b) shall be classified, but it may include an  
23 unclassified annex, if determined appropriate by the Presi-  
24 dent.

1 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after  
2 the date of enactment of this Act, and not less frequently  
3 than every 180 days thereafter for 7, the President or his  
4 or her designee, as well as representatives from the agen-  
5 cies and departments involved in developing the strategy  
6 required in subsection (a) shall consult with the appro-  
7 priate congressional committees regarding the develop-  
8 ment and implementation of the strategy required in this  
9 section. The representatives shall be at the Undersecretary  
10 level or above.

11 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, “potential PLA  
12 campaigns” shall mean—

13 (1) a naval blockade of Taiwan;

14 (2) an amphibious assault and ground invasion  
15 of Taiwan, especially such invasion designed to ac-  
16 complish a fiat accompli before intervention is pos-  
17 sible; and

18 (3) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s out-  
19 lying islands.

20 **SEC. 303. SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S INVESTMENT IN ASYM-**  
21 **METRIC CAPABILITIES.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
23 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense,  
24 in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit  
25 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on

1 options to support Taiwan's defense budgeting and pro-  
2 curement process in a manner that facilitates sustained  
3 investment in capabilities aligned with Taiwan's asym-  
4 metric defense strategy. The report shall include the fol-  
5 lowing:

6 (1) A review of technical advisory options for  
7 enhancing defense budgeting across Taiwan's mili-  
8 tary services in Taiwan that is aligned with Tai-  
9 wan's asymmetric defense strategy.

10 (2) An evaluation of any administrative, institu-  
11 tional, or personnel barriers in the United States or  
12 Taiwan to implementing the options provided in  
13 paragraph (1).

14 (3) An evaluation of the most appropriate enti-  
15 ties within the Department of Defense to lead the  
16 options provided in paragraph (1).

17 (4) An evaluation of the appropriate entities in  
18 Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense and its Na-  
19 tional Security Council to participate in options pro-  
20 vided in paragraph (1).

21 (5) A description of additional personnel, re-  
22 sources, and authorities in Taiwan or in the United  
23 States that may be required to execute the options  
24 provided in paragraph (1).

1 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in sub-  
2 section (a) shall be classified, but it may include an un-  
3 classified summary, if the Secretary of Defense determines  
4 it appropriate.

5 **SEC. 304. ADVANCING TAIWAN'S TERRITORIAL DEFENSE**  
6 **FORCE CONCEPT.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
8 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense,  
9 in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit  
10 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on  
11 options to strengthen Taiwan's implementation of its terri-  
12 torial defense force concept.

13 (b) POLICY OBJECTIVES.—The review shall take into  
14 consideration, but is not limited to, the following policy  
15 goals:

16 (1) Advance Taiwan Reserve's Command ability  
17 to recruit, train, and equip its forces, including its  
18 ability to require and provide regular individual and  
19 collective training to all reserve forces.

20 (2) Enhance Taiwan's ability to respond to hu-  
21 manitarian disasters.

22 (3) Strengthen Taiwan's ability to defend  
23 against, and resist if necessary, PRC military ag-  
24 gression.

25 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—

1           (1) A review of options to provide additional  
2 technical advice, training, or institution building to  
3 support the objectives discussed in subsection (b),  
4 and any other appropriate policy objectives.

5           (2) An assessment of the policy opportunities  
6 and challenges associated with the options provided  
7 in paragraph (1).

8           (3) An assessment of any statutory or adminis-  
9 trative barriers to the options provided in paragraph  
10 (1).

11           (4) A determination of the most appropriate en-  
12 tities within the Department of Defense and in the  
13 Taiwan Reserve Command to lead the options pro-  
14 vided in paragraph (1).

15           (5) An evaluation of the capacity of appropriate  
16 entities in the Department of Defense to support the  
17 options provided in paragraph (1) and of the Taiwan  
18 Reserve Command to absorb the options provided in  
19 paragraph (1).

20           (6) A description of additional resources and  
21 authorities that may be required to execute any of  
22 the options provided in paragraph (1).

23           (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in sub-  
24 section (a) shall be classified, but it may include an un-

1 classified summary, if the Secretary of Defense determines  
2 it appropriate.

3 **SEC. 305. STRENGTHENING TAIWAN'S CIVILIAN DEFENSE**  
4 **PROFESSIONALS.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
6 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in  
7 consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall present  
8 to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for  
9 strengthening the community of civilian defense profes-  
10 sionals in Taiwan.

11 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall  
12 include the following:

13 (1) A comprehensive review of existing United  
14 States Government and non-United States Govern-  
15 ment programmatic and funding modalities to sup-  
16 port Taiwan's civilian defense professionals in pur-  
17 suing professional development, educational, and cul-  
18 tural exchanges in the United States. The review  
19 shall include, but is not limited to—

20 (A) opportunities through Department of  
21 State-supported programs, such as the Inter-  
22 national Visitor Leaders Program; and

23 (B) opportunities offered through non-gov-  
24 ernmental institutions, such as think tanks, to

1           the extent the review can practicably make such  
2           an assessment.

3           (2) A description of the frequency that civilian  
4           defense professionals from Taiwan pursue or are se-  
5           lected for the programs reviewed in paragraph (1).

6           (3) An analysis of any funding, policy, adminis-  
7           trative, or other barriers preventing greater partici-  
8           pation from Taiwan's civilian defense professionals  
9           in the opportunities identified in paragraph (1).

10          (4) An evaluation of the value expanding the  
11          opportunities reviewed in paragraph (1) would offer  
12          for strengthening Taiwan's existing civilian defense  
13          community, and for increasing the perceived value of  
14          the field for young professionals in Taiwan.

15          (5) An assessment of options the United States  
16          Government could take individually, with partners in  
17          Taiwan, or with foreign governments or non-govern-  
18          mental partners, to expand the opportunities re-  
19          viewed in paragraph (1).

20          (6) A description of additional resources and  
21          authorities that may be required to execute the op-  
22          tions in paragraph (5).

23          (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in sub-  
24          section (a) shall be unclassified, but it may include a clas-  
25          sified annex, if determined appropriate.

1 **SEC. 306. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

2 In this title, the term “appropriate congressional  
3 committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the  
5 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-  
6 resentatives, and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, and  
8 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.